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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RUT II CAFF ALL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- Case No. 8447 
\TBl~N CAFF ALL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
RESTATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of facts as set forth by appellant is 
substantially correct. Respondent desires to set a few 
additional facts. 
Appellant served upon respondent certain Inter-
rogatories. The Interrogatories and the answers made 
thereto are as follows : ( R. 15) 
In answer to the Interrogatory: "Did you marry 
C. B. Bradford at Evanston, Wyoming, on the 8th day of 
October, 1935 ~", respondent answered she married C. G. 
Bradford at Evanston, Wyoming, on said date. 
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In answer to the Interrogatory: "Were you legally 
married to him on July 20, 1936f", respondent answered 
that the question called for a legal conclusion, and that 
to the best of her knowledge on said date she was not 
legally married to Mr. Bradford. 
In answer to the Interrogatory: "If you were not 
married to Mr. Br,adford on July 20, 1936, when and 
where were you divorced from Mr. Bradford f", respon-
dent answered that she appeared in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County during approximately the last week 
of October, 1935, with Attorney Mathews for the pur-
pose of obtaining an annulment, which annuhnent she 
thought she had obtained. 
In answer to the Interrogatory: "Was :Jir. Brad-
ford living on July 20, 1936, and if not, when and where 
did he die.", respondent answered that to her best know-
ledge Mr. Bradford was living on July 20, 1936, and died 
sometime in 1939. 
Appellant's Counsel stated that the decree of divorce 
in the cause before the Court w.as void because appellant 
was divorced in June and married in July. (R. 25) Ap-
pellant testified that he had heard rm11ors and 'vas sus-
picious that respondent was a married woman 'vhen he 
married her. (R. 26) Appellant since the diYorce of the 
parties has remarried and his present "\Yife was in court 
at the time of the hearing of this n1a tter. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant argues his case under one point: That 
the Court cormnitted error in denying appellant's peti-
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tion to vacate and set aside the decree of divorce. The 
substance of his argument is that since the marriage 
was void because respondent was not divorced from 
Bradford, the Court had no jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of the action because there was no marriage res 
or subject matter, and, therefore, the decree of divorce 
was void and should have been set aside. 
It is the position of respondent that the Court had 
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the decree was not 
void, and that defendant should be estopped from attack-
ing the judgment. Respondent shall, therefore, present 
her argument under two points as follows: 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OF THE SUB-
JECT MA'T'TER AND THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED 
BY THE COURT WAS NO;T VOID. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ATTA·CK-
ING THE VALIDITY OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
POINT I. 
'THE 'TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OF THE SUB-
JE·CT MAT'TER AND THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED 
BY THE COURT WAS NOT VOID. 
The gist of appellant's brief is stated on page 8 
thereof as follows: 
"It seems to clearly follow that if there is 
in fact no marriage there would be no res or sub-
ject matter over which the court would have juris-
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diction, and any action taken by the court would 
be without jurisdiction and void. In the case at 
bar the great preponderance of evidence shows 
that there was in fact no valid existing marriage 
between the parties at the time the action for 
divorce was commenced or at the time the divorce 
was entered, and for that reason, the court having 
no jurisdiction of the subject matter, the decree 
was void from the beginning." 
Appellant on this subject cites 27 C.J.S., page 812, 
and Nelson on Divorce and Annulment, Vol. 3, page 175, 
Section 28.27. 
A careful reading of the two citations mentioned will 
disclose that in both instances the matter under discus-
sion is the jurisdiction of courts over the subject mat-
ter of the action. The question of what is meant by 
jurisdiction of subject matter in a divorce action is dis-
cussed in Nelson on Divorce and Annulment, (2nd Ed.), 
Vol. 2, page 619, Section 21.01, under the subtitle of 
"Jurisdiction Generally" as follows : 
"Jurisdiction of divorce suits and other mat-
rimonial actions has t'vo facets, as in most other 
instances : ( 1) jurisdiction of subject matter and 
( 2) jurisdiction of the person. The first of these 
may be divided, in turn, into t'Yo phases: (a) has 
the particular court power to entertain and .ad-
judicate actions and controversies of the parti-
cular kind or type~ and (b) does such residence 
or don1icile of one or both of the parties exist 
within its territorial jurisdiction as to meet statu-
tory requiren1ents in this respect." 
The matter of jurisdictional defects is diseussed in 
27 C.J.S. 812, Seetion 169 (c), as follows: 
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"A1 divorce decree granted by a court with-
out jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the 
person,~ is void .and should be set aside irrespec-
tive of t;he question of fraud." 
One of the cases cited in support of the text that 
a divorce decr~e granted by a court without jurisdiction 
of the subject matter is void, is In re Christiansen, 17 
Utah 412; 53 P. 1003. This case points up the meaning 
of "jurisdiction of the supject matter." 
As the court stated in Anderson v. Anderson, 44 N.E. 
(2d) 54, in ruling that the court had jurisdiction of that 
divorce action: 
"In the instant case the circuit court had 
jurisdiction of the p.arties and jurisdiction to 
grant a divorce, award alimony and maintenance 
and to n1ake a property settlement." 
The court stated in Demilly v. Grosrenaud, 66 N.E. 
234: 
"The question to be decided is whether the 
circuit court acquired jurisdiction to render judg-
ment. The court had jurisdiction of the parties 
to the suit, but it was also necessary that it should 
have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, 
and it is in respect to such subject matter that 
its jurisdiction is disputed in this case. Juris dic-
tion of the subject matter finds its source in the 
law creating and governing the court and it is to 
be exercised in the mode and to the extent pre-
scribed by law." (Underscoring ours) 
Appellant cites .at length from Hutton v. Dodge, 198 
P. 165, a Utah case. That case does not discuss the mat-
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ter of the jurisdiction of the subject matter. However, 
the excerpts from the case set forth at page 10 of ap-
pellant's brief and interesting and support the position 
of respondent. 
On the matter of jurisdiction of courts, the law as 
stated in C.J.S. 21, page 36, paragraph 23, is as follows: 
"Jurisdiction of the Subject-Matter. 
"Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the 
power to hear and determine cases of the general 
class to which the proceedings in question belong; 
the power to deal with the general subject in-
volved in the action; and means not simply juris-
diction of the particular case then occupying the 
attention of the court but jurisdiction of the class 
of cases to which the particular case belongs, the 
authority to hear and determine both the class 
of actions to which the action before the court 
belongs and the particular question which it as-
sumes to determine. 'Jurisdiction of the subject-
mater' means the nature of the cause of action and 
relief sought, and such jurisdiction is conferred 
by the sovereign authority which organizes the 
court and is to be sought for in the general na-
ture of the court's powers or in the authority 
especially conferred on the court." 
Again, in the same volume 21, C.J.S., at page 4-! para-
graph 35 (b), the law is stated as follo"?s: 
"Jurisdiction of the subject matter is defined 
supra section 23 as the power to hear and deter-
mine cases of the general class to which the pro-
ceedings in question belong, and, as used in the 
constitutions and statutes, the ",.ord 'jurisdiction' 
means as to subject matter only, unless an ex-
ception arises by reason of its employment in a 
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broader sense. Thus a court has jurisdiction of 
the subject matter when it has the right to try 
the kind of proceeding, whether it be an action 
or suit; when it has jurisdiction of the person 
and the cause is the kind of cause triable in such 
court; when the matter is one over which the 
court's general power extends, and such power 
is regularly called into .action by the applica-
tion or act of the parties concerned. 
"Jurisdiction of the subject matte·r is es-
sential in every ease. Such jurisdiction the court 
acquires by the act of its creation, and possesses 
inherently by its constitution; and it is not de-
pendent on the existence of a good cause of action 
in pliintiff in a cause pending before the court; 
nor upon the sufficiency of the bill or complaint, 
the validity of the demand set forth in the com-
plaint, or plaintiff's right to the relief demanded, 
the regularity of the proceedings, or the correct-
ness of the decision rendered." 
In the case at bar there is no dispute on the matter 
of jurisdiction of the persons. Thus it appears that the 
Court had jurisdiction of the action for divorce brought 
by respondent and the decree of divorce is not void for 
want of jurisdiction. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM AT'TACK-
ING THE VALIDITY O·F 'THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
Appellant knew at the time he entered into the mar-
riage with respondent that he was still married to an-
other woman as stated by his attorney. (R. 25) Relying 
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upon the divorce, he has remarried and is now living with 
another woman. He was also on notice when he married 
respondent that she might then be married to another 
man. (R. 26) 
For these reasons appellant should be estopped to 
set up the invalidity of the decree of divorce. In addi-
tion, appellant has failed to prove that respondent was, 
in fact, married to another man at the time of the mar-
riage. 
The law of estoppel in divorce matters is stated in 
27 C.J.S. 815, Section 171 (b), as follows: 
"As in the case of judgments generally, a 
person may waive his right to have a judgment or 
decree of divorce set aside or vacated, or may be 
estopped by his conduct to ask for such relief. 
* * * Similarly, a party who has accepted the 
benefits of a decree, or who has acted in reliance 
on its validity with full knowledge of its effect, 
cannot, after .a lapse of time, and especially after 
the death of the other party, have it set aside be-
cause it was obtained by fraud or without due 
notice." 
In the case at bar the decree of divorce "\Yas entered 
1n October, 1945. Appellant was cognizant· of all the 
material facts at that time. It was not until July of 195-±, 
nearly nine years later, that appellant filed his petition 
to set aside the decree. 
In the case of Cu JJun ings v. H1.tddlesto u, 226 P. 104, 
99 Okla, 195, the court said: 
'~Conceding that plaintiff~s contention that 
the judgment in the divorce action was void for 
want of jurisdiction of his person, do the farts 
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shown by the record in this case entitle the plain-
tiff to any relief from that decree~ After being 
fully advised and informed as to the existence of 
the decree, he made no objection to its validity, 
but availed himself of the privilege thereby con-
ferred and contracted a second marriage within 
about nine months after learning that the decree 
h.ad been entered. After contracting this second 
marriage, he continued to live with his second 
wife, raising no question as to the validity of the 
decree until after the death of his first wife, and 
then comes in with a petition to vacate the decree 
in order that he may inherit a half interest with 
his minor child in the allotment of the dead 
woman. 
"If there were no established rule of estoppel 
in such cases, this would be a most excellent pro-
ceeding in which to establish one. However, the 
rule is well and generally settled that one who 
accepts the benefits and privileges of a divorce 
decree by a remarriage, even though the decree 
be void for want of jurisdiction, is estopped from 
thereafter assailing such decree. Garner v. Gar-
ner, 38 Ind. 130; Stephens v. Stephens, 51 Ind. 
5-1-2; Sc.ase v. Johnson, 130 Ill. App. 35; State ex 
rel. Hahn v. King, 109 La. 161, 33 South. 121; 
:rvfarvin v. Foster, 61 l\1inn. 154; 63 1~.W. 484, 52 
A1n. St. Rep. 586; Mohler v. Shank, 93 Iowa, 273, 
61 N.vV. 981; Riche·son v. Simmons, 47 Mo. 20; 
Arthur v. Israel, 15 Colo. 14 7, 25 Pac. 81, and 
Richardson's Estate, 132 Pa. 292, 19 AtL 82. And 
the reason for this rule is obvious. Society at 
large is interested in the maintenance of the mar-
riage relation and in the faithful discharge of the 
duties and obligations incident thereto. But after 
those relations have been severed by judicial de-
rree, and that decree fully acquiesced in by the 
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immediate parties with full knowledge thereof, 
society has no further interest in the property 
rights of the parties." 
In the case at bar the object of appellant in filing 
the action to set aside the decree is solely for the pur-
pose of avoiding his obligation to pay the amounts which 
have accrued under the decree for the support of his 
children. 
A case very much in point is that of Johannesen v. 
Johannesen, 128 N.Y.S. 892, 70 Misc. 361, a decision of 
the Supreme Court of New York. In that case the facts 
were that in 1897 plaintiff married and lived for some 
years as husband and wife with one Sandin. One day 
she found a letter purportedly written by a woman in 
Sweden, who claimed to be Sandin's wife. On being con-
fronted with the letter Sandin admitted he had a wife 
living in Sweden. They agreed to separate and went to 
a Justice of the Peace in New Jersey. Sandin admitted 
to him he had a wife living when he married plaintiff. 
The Justice advised that Sandin's n1arriage to plaintiff 
was void, and that it was not necessary to procure an 
annul1nent. A paper called an "Agreement of Separa-
tion" was drawn up, signed and acknowledged by the 
Justice of the Peace in which they recited that they had 
agreed to live separate and apart. Three years later 
plaintiff was employed by defendant as a housekeeper 
for him and his four children. He proposed n1arriage 
to plaintiff. She disclosed all of the foregoing facts, and 
together they went to the Justice of the Peace, and de-
fendant was told by the Justice of the Peace that Sandin's 
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marriage to plaintiff w.as void, and that he and plaintiff 
were free to marry. They married and lived together 
for several years. Plaintiff brought an action for divorce 
and defendant entered a plea that the wife was still 
married to Sandin. The court in denying the defense of 
defendant stated: 
"Another feature is presented: under the cir-
cumstances can defendant be heard in stultifica-
tion of his own act~ Can he be permitted to invoke 
the judgment of the court declaring his marriage 
to be invalid when he, possessed of the knowledge 
of all of the f.acts, induced plaintiff to contract 
the marriage with him and for over seven years 
recognized its validity~" 
The court also held that defendant had failed to establish 
that the marriage of Sandin and plaintiff was a valid 
marriage, and, therefore, that the marriage of plaintiff 
and defendant was invalid. The court said: 
"Apart from the question of ill treatment, the 
issue tendered by the complaint was the marriage 
of the parties. This was admitted, but a new issue 
was r.aised when defendant pleaded a previous 
marriage. This cast upon him the burden of 
proving validity of the first marriage and of over-
coming the presumption that the second marriage 
was valid. While this presumption may be re-
butted by evidence and facts invalidating the 
marriage, such evidence must be strong, satis-
faetory and conclusive, although it involves prov-
ing a negative. Senge v. Senge, 106 Ill. App. 140. 
""\Vhen a marriage has been shown, says Mr. 
Bishop, 'the law raises a strong presumption of 
its legality- not only casting the burden of proof 
on the party objecting, but requiring him through-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
out in every particular to make plain against 
the constant pressure of this presumption the 
truth of the law and fact that it is illegal and void.' 
I Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation, Sec-
tion 956. 
"It is not sufficient to prove the illegality 
of the second marriage to show that at the time 
the husband of the first marriage was still living. 
McKibben v. McKibben, 139 Cal. 448, 73 Pac. 143. 
It must be proven that not only was the first 
marriage valid, but that it was subsisting. Be-
fore the marriage of the parties would be annulled, 
it would have to be proven that the former hus-
band was living and also that the 1narriage was 
then in force. This would involve proving a nega-
tive, that is, that the 'former marriage had not 
been either dissolved or annulled by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. The defendant has failed 
to make such proof, nor has he proven the validity 
of the Sandin marriage." 
In the case at bar respondent in answer to the In-
terrogatories inforn1ed appellant "to the best of 1ny know-
ledge on July 26, 1936, I was not legally married to Mr. 
Bradford." She also informed appellant that she had 
attempted through Attorney l\1athews to obtain an annul-
ment within two or three weeks after the purported mar-
riage to Mr. Bradford. The very fact that she infor1ned 
appellant that she sought an annulment indicated her 
belief that the marriage to Bradford in the first place 
was invalid. Appellant has failed to prove its validity. 
As the court held in Johannsen v. Johannsen, supra, def-
endant had failed to prove the validity of the marriage 
of Sandin and the plaintiff. Since tl1e appellant has 
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failed to prove the validity of respondent's marriage to 
Bradford, the presumption of the validity of his marri-
age to respondent would stand - except for appellant's 
adrnission that he was married to another woman when 
he married respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the court had jurisdiction 
of the subject matter of the divorce, and, therefore, 
the Decree of Divorce was valid. Appellant has failed 
to establish that the marriage of re·spondent and Brad-
ford was a valid and subsisting marriage ,a.t the time of 
the marriage of the parties to this action, and appellant 
knowing that he was married to another woman at the 
time of the marriage, and having remarried, and having 
used the benefits of the Decree of Divorce, cannot nine 
years later attack the same solely for the· purpose of 
avoiding his obligation to pay for the support of his 
minor children as ordered by the court. 
The appeal of appellant should, therefore, ·be dis-
missed. 
Respectfully submited, 
J. GRANT IVERSON, 
Attorney for Respondent 
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